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SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES BE PRECAUTIONARY? 
David A. Weisbach†
February 2, 2012 
 
The precautionary principle requires that we take additional actions to prevent 
harms when the harms from an activity are uncertain and possibly irreversible. 
This paper considers whether environmental or other Pigouvian taxes should 
similarly be precautionary. Should environmental taxes be set higher than 
otherwise if harm from pollution is uncertain and irreversible and where we are 
likely to learn more about the nature of the harm the future. It concludes that 
environmental taxes should be set equal to expected marginal harm from pollution 
given the currently available information and should be neither raised or lowered 
because of the prospect of learning or irreversible harm. The reason is that taxes 
equal to expected marginal harm decentralize decisions to market participants 
who will, facing these taxes, make appropriate choices about the timing of 
pollution. Taxes act similarly to property rights in a complete market where 
market participants produce Pareto outcomes. There are a number of caveats to 
this conclusion including the possibility of endogenous learning, in which our 
understanding of the environmental effects of pollution or the available mitigation 
technologies depends on the level of taxation. 
Keywords: Pigouvian taxation, environmental taxation, precautionary principle, 
climate change, real options, instrument choice 
JEL Codes: H23, K10, Q50 
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There is a considerable body of work in environmental law and 
environmental economics addressing the timing of pollution abatement when 
there is uncertainty about the potential harms from pollution and when emissions 
are irreversible. The core idea is that we might want to reduce pollution now more 
than otherwise to preserve flexibility until we learn more about the size of the 
harms and the likely abatement costs. As we teach our children, better safe than 
sorry. 
Environmental law implements this idea through the precautionary 
principle. There are many statements, differing from one another in important 
details.1
when regulators are dealing with an irreversible loss, and when they 
are uncertain about the timing and likelihood of that loss, they should 
be willing to pay a sum – the option value – in order to maintain 
flexibility for the future.  
 A commonly used version can be found in the 1992 Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Article 3, which states that the parties “should 
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures.” A prominent legal scholar proposed the 
following version which is more explicit and stronger:  
Sunstein (2006). 
Environmental economists have analyzed the problem as one of decision-
making under uncertainty and learning.2
                                                 
1 The essays in Tickner (2003) and Fisher, Jones, and von Schomberg (2006) provide 
summaries of the precautionary principle. 
 In the simplest, two-period models, for 
example, emissions in the first period irreversibly affect the expected marginal 
harm from emissions in the second period and we expect to learn more about the 
harms and to be able to adjust the second period actions accordingly. Under some 
circumstances, we might want to reduce first period emissions to retain flexibility 
in the second period. More complex models include both irreversible harms and 
2 Papers include Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Kolstad (1996a, 1996b), Ulph 
and Ulph (1997), Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000), Pindyck (2000), Pindyck (2002), Gollier and 
Treich (2003), Ingham and Ulph (2005). 
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irreversible expenditures on abatement, so that concerns about flexibility run both 
ways. You have to be safe and not sorry about both potential environmental harms 
and about the possibly of wasting resources on unnecessary abatement. 
To my knowledge, this analysis has never been specifically applied to the 
optimal timing of environmental (or other Pigouvian) taxes.3
The thesis developed here is that as a first order matter, there is no tax 
precautionary principle: the government should not set taxes to preserve 
flexibility in the face of irreversible harms and learning. Environmental taxes 
should be set equal to the expected marginal social harm from an activity, 
adjusted in each period to reflect new information. The reason is that 
environmental taxes decentralize decision making. They impose a price on harm-
causing activities and let individual actors decide the appropriate level of the 
activity given that price. Individual actors will take precautions if appropriate. We 
can think of Pigouvian taxes as completing the market, and like in other situations 
with complete markets, we rely on individuals to determine the appropriate level 
and timing of their activities. The government should not additionally accelerate 
or delay environmental taxes. 
 This is so even 
though environmental taxes are thought by many to be the first best solution to 
pollution problems, preferable to command and control approaches in many 
contexts. The question I address is whether environmental taxes should be 
imposed earlier or at a higher rate when there is an uncertain possibility of 
irreversible environmental harms or later to allow society to learn about the likely 
harms before regulating. Does a version of the precautionary principle apply to 
taxes? 
This statement is subject to a number of important caveats and limitations. 
First, there are many versions of the precautionary principle. By saying that the 
precautionary principle does not apply to taxes, I mean that taxes should not be 
set higher or lower than the expected marginal harm because of precautionary 
                                                 
3 Ko, Lapan, and Sandler (1992), Ulph and Ulph (1994), and Farzin (1996) consider the 
timing of Pigouvin taxes but do not model the choice of irreversible emissions when there is 
learning. Pindyck (2002) (p. 1696) indicates that he believes the solutions to the optimal timing 
problem apply to taxation, but it appears that he assumes that taxes must be adopted on a once-
and-for-all basis and can never be adjusted. This case may have optimal timing elements that are 
different than flexible taxes. Section 5 discusses this issue. 
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motives. Some versions of the precautionary principle may merely require the use 
of expected values and, therefore, are consistent with such taxes.  
Second, it might seem that because there is no tax precautionary principle, 
the information requirements for taxes would be lower than for other regulatory 
mechanisms: the claim would be that we do not have to solve the optimal timing 
problem to set the tax because it is based on expected values. This is not correct. 
To determine expected marginal harm from an activity, the government needs to 
understand the extent to which individual actors take precautions. The reason is 
that for stock pollutants, the marginal harm from current emissions depends on 
the stock of emissions in the future. This in turn depends on the level of 
precaution that individual actors take. Therefore, to determine the marginal harm 
from current emissions, the government must know how individuals respond to 
uncertainty, irreversibility, and learning. The government cannot simply ignore 
these problems because it is using taxes even though taxes should be set equal to 
expected marginal harm.  
Third, optimal Pigouvian taxes are equal to the current estimate of marginal 
harm given the then-available information. If taxes do not adjust to new 
information, they will often be too high or too low, giving rise to timing 
considerations similar to the precautionary considerations that arise in command 
and control regimes.  
Finally, the basic analysis assumes that information arrives exogenously. 
The price on pollution, however, may affect the pace of technological 
development. The interaction between technological development and Pigouvian 
taxes is complex because general technology policies such as research and 
development incentives will often apply to abatement technologies. Setting 
abatement policies to, say, increase the pace of technological development may 
not be appropriate if general technology policies already cause individuals to fully 
internalize positive externalities from technological development. 
The paper comes in six parts. Part 1 provides three motivating examples. 
Part 2 sets forth a two-period model to capture the idea of decision-making when 
there is an uncertain but irreversible harm where we will learn more about the 
harm in the future. Part 3 considers the solution to the model in three 
circumstances: (i) as a problem of consumer behavior; (ii) an externality solved 
by taxation; and (iii) an externality solved by tort liability or by specifying 
property rights. It shows that if taxes are based on expected harm, actors will be 
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behave the same was as when the problem is one of consumer behavior. Torts and 
property rights can achieve the same result, so that Pigouvian taxes, torts, and 
property rights should be seen as substitutes for one another. Part 4 then examines 
how the tax solution to the model compares to the precautionary principle. Part 5 
considers caveats and extensions to the model. Part 6concludes. 
1. Motivating examples 
I begin with three examples to motivate the analysis. The first is based on 
Arrow and Fisher (1974), which originated much of the relevant literature. They 
consider the choice to clear cut and develop a virgin redwood forest. Once the 
forest is cut, it cannot be restored within a reasonable time period, so the 
development decision is irreversible. Moreover, the value of the developed land 
will change as will the value of the land in its undeveloped state, and the owner 
will learn these values with the passage of time. The question is when the owner 
should develop the land, if ever. Arrow and Fisher seem to have in mind a public 
choice about the timing of this decision. If, however, the decision maker is the 
owner of the property and there are no externalities (none are specified), the 
decision can be viewed as a problem of consumer choice. 
The second example is similar but has a clear harm to a third party. 
Consider a downstream owner of land who wants to build a dam on a stream or 
river abutting his property. Building the dam, however, will flood upstream 
property owners, permanently destroying their property. We do not know the 
future value of the destroyed property, nor do we know the future value of the 
benefits from the dam (such as flood control, power, and irrigation). The owner 
has to decide whether to build the dam now or wait. Although we might classify 
this problem as one of natural resource use, it has the same structure as 
environmental problems. 
The final example is climate change. Carbon has a very long atmospheric 
life. For policy purposes, substantial portions of it can be treated as staying in the 
atmosphere indefinitely and there is no way to remove it. Marginal harm from 
emissions goes up with the stock of emissions, so that emitting a unit of carbon 
today increases the marginal harm from emissions in the future and this effect 
may be highly nonlinear. We do not, however, currently know the harm that a unit 
of emissions will cause and, moreover, we do not know the costs of abatement in 
the future. The question is whether we should reduce emissions more today 
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because of this uncertainty or perhaps wait to reduce emissions because of the 
same uncertainty.  
In all three examples, current decisions inalterably affect the future but the 
amount of the resulting harm is unknown. In deciding what to do now, therefore, 
we have to consider the future effects. This structure describes some but by no 
means all pollution or natural resource problems. Many pollutants only affect the 
immediate period and then dissipate. For example, the release of a toxic chemical 
might cause immediate harm and the chemical might then degrade or be absorbed 
into the environment. Uncertainty about these sorts of flow pollutants might affect 
how much care is taken for example because of risk aversion. The focus here is on 
the first type of problem, where emissions today affect the value of actions in the 
future. 
2. A Simple Model of the Problem 
We want to model the choices in these examples in the simplest possible 
setting that reflects both that the acivity results in permanent harm and that we 
will learn more about the size of that harm in the future. Much of the literature has 
focused on a model in which an actor/polluter has to determine a level of activity 
and resulting emissions ei in each of two periods.4
Let 
 Emissions in the first period 
cause damages of an unknown quantity in the second period and cannot be 
reversed. Before deciding on second period actions, however, the actor learns 
more about the harm from emissions and can adjust, such as by engaging in less 
of the activity if damages turn out to be high or by increasing the level of activity 
if damages turn out to be low. 
( )1 2e eθ δ + be stochastic damages, which are a function of the stock of 
emissions in the second period. Emissions depreciate at rate 1-δ, so that δe1 of 
first period emissions are left in the second period, and the total stock in the 
second period is δe1+e2.5
                                                 
4 Kolstad (1996a), Ulph and Ulph (1997), Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000), Ingham and 
Ulph (2005) all use this model.  
 First period expectations of the damages are based on 
5 The extent to which period 1 emissions affect period 2 is determined by δ. If δ=0, the 
pollutant is a flow pollutant – it completely dissipates. If δ>0, the pollutant has stock 
characteristics – it accumulates in the environment and increases the marginal harm from 
emissions in later periods. More formally, 
1
0,  if 0,eθ δ∂ ∂ > >

 
and
1
0,  if 0.eθ δ∂ ∂ = =  
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the information set ỹ. Before the second period the actor will receive new 
information, y, which allows him to revise his estimate of the damages and choose 
e2 accordingly. Discounting between periods is omitted for simplicity. 
We can write down this problem as: 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2|0 0
second period choice given new information
max max ,y ye eu e E E v e e eθ θ δ≥ ≥
 
  + − +  
  





 
where the actor gets utility u and v from emissions in periods 1 and 2.6
Equation (1) says that we want to choose emissions in period 1 to maximize 
period 1 utility plus the expected value of period 2 utility given that we will make 
a choice about period 2 emissions with better information. The internal expected 
value term in the second term reflects that second period choice given new 
information. The external expected value in the second term reflects current 
expectations about this second period choice. The central idea in (1) is that we 
want to know how to choose period 1 emissions given flexibility in period 2. We 
cannot simply use the expected value of emissions as of today. Instead, we have 
to consider the expected value as of today given a future choice based on new 
information.  
 Emissions 
in the second period cannot be less than zero, so that any remaining stock of 
emissions from first period activity cannot be reversed. Learning is reflected by 
the choice of second period activity after new information y is revealed. 
Note that (1) contains an important simplification, which is that there are no 
sunk abatement costs. Reducing emissions in (1) just requires doing less. 
Reducing emissions, however, often requires expending capital on abatement 
technology. If harm ends up being low, those expenditures are wasted. For 
example, if climate change turns out to be not so bad, money spent on carbon 
capture and storage will have been wasted as this technology has no beneficial 
effects other than reducing carbon in the atmosphere. In a more complete model, 
                                                 
6 Ulph and Ulph (1997) and Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) write the utility in the 
second period as nonseparable in damages: ( )[ ]
2 1 2
.v e e eθ δ− + I use an additively separable form 
because the central case considered here is where the damages fall on third parties. Separability is 
a natural assumption in this case. 
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there would be offsetting sunk costs: emissions of pollutants in period 1 are sunk 
because of the irreversibility constraint; abatement resources spent in period 1 are 
sunk because these resources cannot be immediately redeployed. The two 
irreversibilities, and any resulting desire to preserve flexibility, go in opposite 
directions. To keep the problem simple, we just consider sunk emissions.7
3. Solution 
 
3.1 As a consumer problem 
Start by considering the solution to (1) where the actor faces all of the costs 
and benefits from actions. Although such an actor might be taken to be a 
government planner, it can also be an individual who gets the benefits and bears 
the costs of his actions. The clear-cutting example used by Arrow and Fisher 
(1974) might be an example. The owner of the property will receive both the 
benefits of development and the loss of the virgin forest, so he appears to bear all 
of the costs and benefits of his actions.  
In this situation, the actor chooses emissions in the first period, e1, to 
maximize (1). The question is whether the emissions are higher or lower than 
without irreversibility and/or learning. Irreversibility is reflected in the constraint 
that e2 ≥ 0. The effect of this constraint is relatively straightforward. The prospect 
of irreversible harm will reduce emissions in the first period. If the irreversibility 
constraint binds in some states of the world, this increases the expected marginal 
damages from period 1 emissions, making it desirable to reduce period 1 
emissions as compared to the case where there is no such constraint. The size of 
the effect depends on the likelihood that the constraint binds – that in the future 
we will want to reduce the stock by emitting a negative amount. This depends on 
damages and on the depreciation rate. The greater the likelihood of high damages 
for a given stock and the lower the depreciation rate (higher δ in the notation in 
(1)), the more likely the irreversibility constraint binds.  
Learning is reflected by the flexibility to choose second period emissions 
given new information y. The effect of learning is ambiguous. It may increase 
first period emissions because it lowers expected harm from second period 
emissions. If we expect to know more about the effects of emissions in the future, 
we can choose the level of emissions in the future more intelligently, so expected 
                                                 
7 Kolstad (1996a and 1996b) addresses the dual-sided problem. 
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harm in the second period as of the first period is lower. It may, on the other hand, 
reduce first period emissions because lower first period emissions preserve 
flexibility, giving the information greater value.  
Epstein (1980) provides a complete characterization of the solution. Define
yπ  as the updated probability distribution for values of θ given new information 
y. Epstein (1980) shows that if the marginal value of the second term in (1) with 
respect to first period emissions is concave with respect to ,yπ the prospect of 
learning reduces first period emissions and if it is convex, learning increases first 
period emissions. It is not easy, however, to develop an intuition for concavity of 
marginal second period utility with respect to updated information. 
As a result, solutions to (1) have focused on special cases. For example, 
Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) show that for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion 
utility in period 2, learning reduces first period emissions if and only if the 
measure of relative risk aversion is between zero and 1. Ulph and Ulph (1997) 
consider the case where both v(e) and θ are quadratic.8 In this case, the prospect 
of learning increases first period emissions.9
Regardless of the details of the solution, if the actor bears all of the costs 
and benefits of his actions, the choice will be socially optimal. When there are no 
  
                                                 
8 The damage function θ is fixed and known in their model. Uncertainty comes about 
through a random multiplier on damages. 
9 Other approaches to modeling the problem do not yield simple results either. For 
example, Pindyck (2000) considers a continuous time model with uncertainty both with respect to 
emissions (e.g., how the stock evolves for a given flow) and damages and with irreversible 
damages and abatement expenditures. Damages in his model are a quadratic function of the stock 
of pollutant and are uncertain because of an uncertain damage parameter that acts on the stock. 
There are no available closed form solutions to this model. Balikcioglu, Fackler, and Pindyck 
(2011) provide numerical solutions to this problem and show that policies are adopted later if 
uncertainty increases or depreciation is greater (so that the policy is less irreversible). Keller, 
Bolker, and Bradford (2004) use a computational model of the economy with the possibility of a 
sudden irreversible harm such as the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. In one of their cases, they 
compare abatement when there is learning to when there is no learning. They find under their 
parameterization that abatement decreases when there is learning, indicating that the value of 
flexibility with respect to abatement capital is greater than the value of flexibility regarding the 
irreversible harm.  
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identifiable externalities, we can think of (1) as an ordinary problem of consumer 
or producer choice. Actors regularly face these sorts of problems. 
3.2 Taxation 
Suppose that the actor in (1) does not bear second period harm so that (1) is 
a model of an externality such as climate change. The actor will emit too much 
because he does not consider the effects of his activities. In deciding on first 
period emissions, he considers only the first term in (1). The standard Pigouvian 
tax solution to externalities is a tax equal to the marginal harm from the activity. 
The questions whether this solution applies in the present context.  
Consider a charge, such as a fine, imposed in second period equal to the 
harm ( )1 2| .yE e eθ θ δ +     The actor facing this charge will fully take into account 
all the costs and benefits of the activity. The actor will receive his own utility in 
each period, u(e1) and v(e2) and in the second period face a fine equal to
( )1 2| .yE e eθ θ δ +     Therefore, the actor will maximize (1) and make the same 
choices as in the case with no externality. 
When we impose a second period charge or a fine, the actor, in period 1, has 
to determine his actions based on the information available in period 1. In 
particular, when there is a second period fine equal to actual harm, the polluter 
must determine how first period emissions change the expected value of the fine 
given current information and knowing that he will learn more and have the 
flexibility to adjust his behavior in the second period. That is, the actor in the first 
period chooses emission faced with the marginal expected fine. A first period tax 
equal to this amount – marginal expected harm from emissions – will, therefore, 
have same effect as second period fine.10
To compute the tax, let
  
*
2e  be the polluter’s choice of second period 
emissions given the information available in the second period and subject to an 
additional charge for the harm that those emissions cause. Note that *2e  is a 
                                                 
10 One difference is that a tax equal to the expected value would provide a certain cost for 
polluting while a fine equal to actual harm would be uncertain. If the actor is risk averse, the 
resulting behavior may be different. In the model used here, where utility is linear in damages, this 
should not affect the result. In more general models, we would want to impose a charge equal to 
the dollar equivalent expected utility costs from the pollution.  
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function of e1 and δ because δe1 affects the marginal harm from emissions in the 
second period, and it is a function of v because it is determined as part of the 
second period maximization. The tax is the (present value of) expected marginal 
harm from first period emissions ( )' *1 2| .yE e eθ θ δ +     With this tax, the result 
would be the same with the fine in the second period: the polluter would fully 
take the expected externality into account when deciding on emissions in time 1.  
The period 2 tax is simpler. New information y is revealed and θ is 
correspondingly updated. The polluter need only be charged the marginal harm 
from emissions in period 2: ( )1 2' .e eθ δ + This is just the standard Pigouvian tax 
with the exception that harm depends on the stock of prior emissions, δe1. Given 
this tax, the polluter will make the optimal decision in period 2. 
The conclusion, therefore, is a tax based on expected marginal harm from 
emissions causes the actor to make the same choices as an actor who fully 
internalizes the harm. An actor who fully internalizes the harm has to make 
choices in the first period based on this expectation so a tax equal to this amount 
produces the same result. 
3.3 Property rights and tort liability 
It is helpful in considering the results discussed above to compare 
Pigouvian taxes to property rights and tort liability. Even if the actor does not bear 
the harm, the actor will make the socially optimal choice if property rights are 
complete so that the individuals who do bear the harm can charge the polluter. 
Coase (1960). Consider the dam example, where the harm is water run-off onto a 
neighbor’s land, flooding it and reducing its value. If the actor had to pay for this 
use of the neighbor’s land, the actor would face a charge of ( )1 2| ,yE e eθ θ δ +    the 
harm that he has caused. The actor will bear the full social consequences from his 
action, and the individual optimization will again equal social optimization. As 
Coase emphasized, if property rights are complete (and bargaining does not fail 
because of transactions costs), decisions will be socially optimal. 
Tort liability for actual harm ( )1 2| ,yE e eθ θ δ +     also solves the problem.
11
                                                 
11 I generally use strict liability as the example of tort liability. Strict liability imposes a 
charge equal to harm regardless of the care level taken by the polluter. Negligence, on the other 
 
Tort liability is simply a variant of a fine except that the payment is to the harmed 
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party rather than the government (and enforcement is private instead of public). 
The individual, expecting a charge equal to actual harm will maximize (1), 
achieving the social optimum. In some situations, such as nuisances, a tort suit 
can result in an injunction against the harm-causing activity. In this case, tort 
liability effectively creates a property right: the actor cannot cause the harm 
without negotiating and obtaining permission from the harmed party. 
Suppose that because of concerns about liquidity or bankruptcy, the 
government required polluters to prepay expected tort liabilities such as by 
posting a bond, or purchasing insurance. The payment at time 1 for a unit of 
emissions would be equal to the marginal expected harm given the information 
known at time 1, ( )' *1 2| ,yE e eθ θ δ +    which is the same as the Pigouvian tax. If a 
polluter prepays this amount, he will internalize the harm. In fact, we can think if 
Pigouvian taxes as prepaid tort liability, where the payment is to the government 
rather than the harmed party.  
We can, therefore, think of the three instruments, taxes, torts (or fines), and 
property rights as substitute mechanisms for decentralizing decision-making. The 
choice among the three instruments will be based on considerations of 
administrative feasibility, enforcement costs, and similar considerations.12
                                                                                                                                     
hand, imposes a charge equal to harm if and only if the care level is suboptimal. Taxes equivalent 
to negligence could also be considered but would be more complex. 
 For 
example, in some respects, tort liability seems like the simplest system because 
we wait until there is actual harm before imposing sanctions. We do not have to 
compute expected harm. On the other hand, tort liability requires tracing harm to 
individual tort-feasors. If the harm occurs long after the pollution or is dispersed 
and due to a large number of actors, tort liability may not be feasible. Similarly, 
property rights are effective in many contexts but may be difficult to use in other 
situations, such as when the harm is dispersed. It is likely impossible, for 
12 See Kaplow (2011) and Weisbach (2011) for discussions of the administrative 
considerations in choosing between a property-type regime and taxation. Shavell (2011) discusses 
the choice between torts and taxation and concludes that for broad-based pollution problems, such 
as climate change or emissions into a large body of water, taxes may be preferred whereas for 
traditional nuisances, tort liability is preferred. In subsequent work, he notes that an advantage of 
tort liability is that the government needs only to measure actual harm, reflecting similar reasoning 
to that in the text. Shavell (2012).  
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example, to create property rights in the context of climate change, and we have 
to instead rely on administrative surrogates, such as cap and trade systems.  
4. The precautionary principle
 
We can now ask whether the optimal Pigouvian tax is consistent with the 
precautionary principle. As noted, the precautionary principle is one of the 
primary legal tools for answering questions about the timing of pollution and 
abatement activities. The precautionary principle is embodied in numerous 
treaties and court decisions, although it is accepted much more broadly in Europe 
than in the United States.13
While the precautionary principle is widely used in environmental law, 
there is, unfortunately, no single meaning of the term, so there may be no single 
answer to whether it is consistent with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Different versions 
make different demands on environmental policy. I will present what I view as the 
central precautionary principle and then alternative interpretations. 
 
4.1 The central precautionary principle 
I take as the central claim of the precautionary principle that we should take 
additional care when there is risk of harm. This means reducing pollution or other 
activities which have the potential to cause harm more than is required through 
the use of expected values, such as those used in standard cost-benefit analysis. 
That is, I take the precautionary principle as saying that we should use something 
other than cost-benefit analysis and should not merely compare expected marginal 
benefits to the expected marginal harms.  
Many but by no means all invocations of the precautionary principle seem 
to have something like this in mind, although statements of the precautionary 
principle are rarely clear on this issue. For example, the United Nations 
commissioned a body to study the precautionary principle, the World 
Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (which is 
part of UNESCO). It defined the precautionary principle as stating that “when 
human activities lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible 
but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm.” COMEST 
                                                 
13 The United States, as a signatory to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, has 
accepted it in some contexts. 
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(2005) Morally unacceptable harm is defined broadly to include threats to human 
life or health, so it includes just about any harm. The statement of the needed 
precautions contains no reference to costs. This version, therefore, would seem to 
require precautions well above those required through the use of expected 
values.14
Academics have posed a similar interpretation of the precautionary 
principle. Richard Stewart formulated a version of the precautionary principle 
(but did not endorse it) as stating that “activities that present an uncertain 
potential for significant harm should be prohibited unless the proponent of the 
activity shows that it presents no appreciable risk of harm.” Stewart (2002) 
Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000), Gollier and Treich (2003) and Sunstein (2006) 
attempt to ground the precautionary principle in option analysis. As quoted in the 
introduction, Sunstein would require regulators to reduce emissions to preserve 
flexibility when there are irreversible losses and uncertainty about the timing and 
likelihood of the loss. Gollier, and co-authors base the precautionary principle on 
a model similar to (1). They argue that the government ought to mandate 
precaution in circumstances where the solution to (1) is lower first-period 
emissions as compared to the case where there is no learning and no 
irreversibility. 
 Another example can be found in the Final Declaration of the First 
European Seas at Risk Conference, which says that if “the ‘worst case scenario’ 
for a certain activity is serious enough then even a small amount of doubt as to the 
safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place.” Proceedings of the First 
European Seas at Risk Conference, Annex I  (1995). 
We can say from the analysis above that this version of the precautionary 
principle is inconsistent with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes should not 
be raised above an amount calculated using expected values because of 
precautionary motives. The reason is that Pigouvian taxes decentralize decision-
making by forcing actors to face the full costs of their choices. Actors facing the 
full social costs of their choices will take precaution where appropriate. Once we 
have imposed a Pigouvian tax, it is as it we have complete property rights and the 
actions at issue are like other actions chosen in functioning markets. To the extent 
                                                 
14 The Commission, however, hedged this strong statement by stating that actions should 
be chosen that are proportional to the harm and with consideration of their positive and negative 
consequences, making it unclear of the extent to which their version of the precautionary principle 
is inconsistent with the use of expected values.  
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we interpret the precautionary principle in this manner, there is no tax 
precautionary principle. 
This can be seen in the optimal tax, ( )' *1 2| .yE e eθ θ δ +     It is equal to the 
expected harm from emissions in the first period. It is not adjusted upward to 
ensure additional precaution. Indeed, adjusting the tax upward to so that actors 
take additional precaution would lead to sub-optimal activity. Individual actors 
facing the optimal tax will already take appropriate precautions. 
4.2 Other interpretations 
There are a number of other possible interpretations of the precautionary 
principle. I highlight three here. 
Use expected values. Although one of the central reasons for the 
precautionary principle seems to be the claim that we should use something other 
than standard risk analysis using expected values, some versions of the 
precautionary principle seem to merely require the use of expected values; they do 
not explicitly require additional precaution. The goal seems to be to prevent 
opponents of environmental action from using uncertainty as an argument for not 
acting. For example, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(1992), states: 
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) is similar, stating 
that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing action. The Wingspread declaration, 
one of the most well-known statements of the precautionary principle, is 
consistent with this view. It states that “when an activity raises threats of harm to 
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if 
some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.” 
Wingspread (1998). 
If the precautionary principle is interpreted this way, it is not inconsistent 
with optimal Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes are calculated using expected 
values, so they do not ignore uncertainty or allow uncertainty to be an excuse for 
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not imposing a tax. Indeed, if there is a small probability of a large harm, the 
expected harm might be large and the resulting tax high.  
Procedural versions. Some versions of the precautionary principle are 
procedural. Polluters often may have better information than the public about the 
likely harms from an activity. If the public does not know about the harms, it may 
be difficult to determine the appropriate level of regulation. By assuming the 
worst in this situation and, therefore, threatening to regulate, the public can force 
disclosure of the information. Although it is never, to my knowledge, specified, 
presumably once the private information is disclosed, all that is required is 
standard cost-benefit analysis (unless, say, the central version of the precautionary 
principle applies in addition to the procedural version). The Wingspread 
declaration is an example of the procedural version of the precautionary principle. 
It states that in the context of applying the precautionary principle, “the proponent 
of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”  
To the extent that the precautionary principle is merely procedural, it is not 
inconsistent with setting taxes based on expected values. If there is an information 
problem in which private parties have information about expected harm not 
currently available to the government, it will similarly affect the computation of 
taxes and regulations. 
Ambiguity aversion. Finally, some versions of the precautionary principle, 
such as those found in von Schomberg (2006) and Gardiner (2006), appear to be 
grounded in ambiguity aversion. The argument is that if our knowledge of the 
risks from an activity is insufficient to form unique priors we should minimize the 
risk of the worst outcomes. We should, in the face of deep uncertainty, take high 
levels of precaution. These arguments are based on decision theory, such as 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which in turn is based on experiments on human 
responses to ambiguity, such as Ellsberg (1961). (Ellsberg, recall, showed that 
individuals will pay less for a bet where they do not know the odds.) Rawls 
(1999) can be seen as making a similar claim about how actors would choose 
when behind the veil of ignorance. 
The analysis of optimal taxes under conditions of ambiguity goes beyond 
the analysis here. The evaluation of (1) assumed that we could form expectations, 
and it is not clear what the appropriate model would be and what its solution 
would look like if we cannot. It is possible that optimal Pigouvian taxes when 
there is ambiguity would be higher than otherwise, reflecting precaution, but 
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without further and substantial analysis, we do not know. We do not, for example, 
know whether the ambiguity aversion seen in Ellsberg-type experiments on 
individuals is desirable or a mere behavioral regularity, and without sorting out 
this and other issues, we do not know how taxes should be set in these 
circumstances. 
5. Extensions 
5.1 Instrument choice 
The analysis above has implications for the choice between market-based 
instruments and command and control regulations. The core claim made here is 
that to determine the optimal Pigouvian tax in the context of stock pollutants with 
irreversible emissions and learning, we need to know how individuals and firms 
solve the optimal timing problem. The information requirements for this are 
similar to those required for command and control regulations. Pigouvian taxes in 
the present setting have smaller informational advantages than in other contexts. 
There is a substantial literature comparing command and control systems to 
pricing systems, (which, because of their prevalence, is usually some sort of cap 
and trade system rather than a tax).15
                                                 
15 A number of papers are collected in Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation  
(2007) and Emissions Trading, Environmental Policy's New Approach  (2000). The results of 
empirical comparisons between command and control and market-based systems are mixed. Most 
studies seem to show advantage to market-based systems but the size of advantage is unclear. 
There are a number of difficulties in making the comparison. The primary problem is that we have 
to compare an existing regulation to a counterfactual.  There is no single choice of command and 
control or market-based instruments to be the alternative, so even specifying what the 
counterfactual should be is not straightforward. For example, there are numerous versions of 
command and control regulations, some which are quite rigid and some which are flexible and 
resemble market-based systems. If a researcher is to compare how much better, say, the cap and 
trade system for SO2 is (enacted in the U.S. in 1990 to control acid rain) than the command and 
control alternative, the researcher has to specify what that alternative is. Moreover, determining 
what the world would have looked like given this choice involves speculation. As a result, the 
precise level of gains (if any) from moving to market-based systems is unclear. Nevertheless, 
market-based systems are thought to have an informational advantage over command and control 
regulations. 
 The basic claim is that command and control 
requires more information than market-based systems which harness private 
information. In their most extreme form, command and control regulations require 
the government to specify particular emissions reductions or the use of a 
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particular technology for individual firms. The government has to know each 
firm’s marginal abatement cost and, moreover, as individual firms develop 
technologies, the government has to update the regulations to reflect the new 
marginal costs for individual firms. 
With a tax, at least in a simple setting, the government does not need to 
know the costs of emissions abatement. As Kaplow and Shavell (2002) point out, 
if the government announces a tax schedule equal to marginal harm at different 
levels of emissions, firms, knowing their own abatement costs and facing this 
price will optimize. Moreover, firms can pursue a variety of strategies and are 
rewarded for finding low-cost methods of mitigation.  
Cap and trade systems are slightly more complex but can achieve the same 
results as a tax with the same information. Cap and trade systems establish a price 
for the quantity of permits issued through the market for permits. The 
government, seeing this price, can adjust the quantity to ensure that the 
price/quantity pair is on the marginal harm curve. For example, if for a given 
quantity of permits, the trading price of permits is higher than the marginal harm, 
the government can issue more permits. The government can also automate this 
by setting a schedule permits with specified prices as described initially by 
Roberts and Spence (1976). Weisbach (2011) reviews a number of mechanisms 
for the designing of cap and trade systems to be the same as a Pigouvian tax. 
The possibility of irreversibilities and learning reduces the informational 
advantages of pricing systems. The reason is that to set a market-price on 
pollutants (either directly through a tax or indirectly through a cap), we have to 
know what future emissions will be because the marginal harm from emissions 
today depends on the future stock.  
The optimal tax on a stock pollutant is the sum of the present value of the 
marginal harm from emissions in all future periods. If marginal harm is nonlinear 
in emissions, to calculate the harm from a unit of emissions today, we have to 
know what emissions will be in the future. This means that we must understand 
how individuals solve the timing problem. The tax today  depends on what people 
do in the future. Factors such as expected learning that change how polluters solve 
the timing problem influence the marginal harm from emissions today. Thus, an 
indirect evaluation of the optimal timing problem can enter the calculation, even 
though this is only to calculate marginal harm. 
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In particular, in (1), have to know *2e to set the first period tax. Future 
emissions, however, depend on available technology and the choices firms make. 
The information required to set a Pigouvian tax in this context is not all that 
different from the information required to impose some forms of command and 
control regulations. Taxes may retain an advantage in that the regulator only 
needs to know the variables that enter (1) (or more realistic versions of (1)) in the 
aggregate rather than at the firm level, but the advantage is smaller than in simpler 
contexts, such as for flow pollutants. 
The information problem makes tort liability seem attractive over either 
command and control systems or taxation. Tort liability is equal to actual realized 
harm, so the information costs might be lower. We do not have to estimate *2.e  
Instead, we can wait and observe actual harm. For many environmental issues, 
however, tort liability may have other problems, such as that by the time the harm 
arises, the polluter may be judgment proof or that the harm may be sufficiently 
diffuse that the costs of bringing suit or tracing the harm to polluters overwhelm 
the potential recovery.  
5.2 Taxes that do not adjust to new information  
It is a widespread trope that taxes should be stable. This is captured in 
aphorism that an old tax is a good tax. While it may or may not be true for other 
types of taxes, it is not true for Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian taxes should always be 
equal to current estimate of marginal harm from activity. If expected marginal 
harm changes, the tax rate should change. For Pigouvian taxes, artificial stability 
is bad.16
To consider the issue, we need to consider a three period problem. In (2), I 
have modified (1) to add a middle period where we receive new information 
 
                                                 
16 Ko, Lapan, and Sandler (1992) consider a related problem. They show that first-best 
Pigouvian taxes should be adjusted continuously and then examine how best to set rigid taxes. 
They do not particularly address uncertainty and learning, however. 
 Note that most of the literature on the choice between taxes and quantity limits, following 
Weitzman (1974), relies on non-adjustment to new information as a source of differences in the 
two systems. The focus here is on the level of taxation not on the choice of instruments. For a 
discussion of how flexibility and adjustment to new information affect instrument choice, see 
Kaplow (2011) and Weisbach (2011). 
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about the likely harm and can adjust behavior accordingly. The harm occurs in the 
last period, as before. (To keep the notation simple, I assume that all the 
information is revealed in the second period; no new information is revealed in 
period 3.) 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
1 3
2
2
1 2 3 1 2 3| |0 0
0
max max max .y yy ye e
e
u e E E u e E E v e e e eθ θ θ δ δ≥ ≥
≥
 + + − + +    
  
Suppose that we set a tax in the first period based on the expected harm and the 
expected choice of emissions given that harm and subsequent information. 
Further, suppose that notwithstanding the information revealed in the second 
period, the tax is not adjusted. First period actions will be optimal because the tax 
is set based in then-available information. In second period, however, the tax is 
now too high or too low given the newly-revealed information. From the 
perspective of the second period, the actor is no longer choosing optimally. There 
would be gain from adjusting the tax in the second period to reflect the new 
information.  
For example, suppose that we set taxes on carbon dioxide to prevent climate 
change, and then we learn that climate change is worse than we expected. If taxes 
are not adjusted, they will be too low given the new information, and emissions 
will be too high. Welfare will be lower than it could be. Moreover, a polluter 
knowing that future emissions will not be optimal may adjust current emissions. 
Similarly, if we learn that the effects of emissions are not as bad as feared, future 
taxes should go down. If they are not adjusted, emissions will be too low given 
their modest damages, and welfare will again be lower than the optimum.  
One way to see this is to analogize taxes to property rights. The price of 
property varies with market conditions. Taxes, as a substitute for fully-specified 
property rights, should similarly vary. For example, if in (2), θ represented harm 
to a specific piece of property, as in the dam example, it would vary all the time 
and the government would not normally try to limit price changes. The individual 
would consider the variance of θ when determining first period emissions and in 
the second period would face a price based on the information available then. 
What property owner, upon realizing, say, that harms from third party actions are 
going to be higher than previously thought would fail to increase the charge for 
the harm? A Pigouvian tax is like government assertion of property rights in the 
polluted asset – you have to pay the government marginal harm to use the asset. 
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The government’s charge for use should vary like other property rights so that the 
individual will solve (2). 
Although there is a welfare gain from adjusting the tax rate, suppose we do 
not adjust it, say because the administrative costs are high. We want to know 
whether, if we must have a rigid tax, it should be higher or lower than a flexible 
Pigouvian tax. We might set rigid Pigouvian taxes higher than flexible taxes if the 
harm from failing to increase taxes when appropriate is greater than the loss from 
failing to reduce taxes when appropriate. We might anticipate the failure to adjust 
taxes and set them initially at a level that minimizes the costs of rigidity.  
While anticipation of this sort might be valuable, the direction of 
adjustment is not clear without a greater specification of the problem. The loss 
from the tax being higher or lower than optimal depends on both the curvature of 
the utility from consumption, v(e2) and on damages, θ. While we may have views 
about the curvature of the utility function, the shape of the damage function will 
depend on the particular pollutant and circumstances. A rigid tax may be 
optimally set higher or lower than a flexible tax depending on the curvature of θ. 
5.3 Endogenous technology/information 
In the model considered thus far, information arrives exogenously. 
Scientists or engineers independently conduct experiments which produce the 
information y used to set second period emissions. While some information may 
arrive exogenously, much of it will be endogenous to policy. The price on 
emissions will determine the incentive to innovate. 
Many believe that in climate change, the development of technology is by 
far the most important variable because of the very high welfare costs of pure 
abatement strategies (i.e. using less) for energy.  Fossil fuels are the 
overwhelmingly dominant source of energy and if emissions eventually have to 
be near zero to stabilize CO2 in the atmosphere, these sources will have to be 
eliminated. Standards of living correlate highly with energy use. Without 
replacing that energy, the result would be a severe decline in standards of living. 
Therefore, reducing the risks from climate change while retaining modern 
standards of living will require substantial technological developments. These will 
likely depend on the price placed on carbon.  
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Solutions to other pollution problems may depend less on technological 
developments – pure abatement may be a more feasible option in many cases – 
but technology can make solutions cheaper. The effect of a Pigouvian tax on 
technological development will be important in many cases. The question is 
whether and how endogenous information affects the tax in period 1.  
In a simple setting with a flow pollutant, we should set the tax equal to 
marginal harm and not worry about the effects on technology. Once the harm is 
priced, environmental technology is just like any other technology for markets 
where there is no externality. Although it is now understood that knowledge 
spillovers and/or increasing returns to knowledge may require special policies 
toward technology such as subsidies for research and development, there is 
nothing special about environmental technologies in this regard. Once a (flow) 
environmental externality is priced through a tax, general R&D policies that apply 
to all areas of the economy should govern. Any additional R&D policy aimed at 
an environmental problem would tilt R&D policies away from those with the 
highest potential. 
This approach may not work in the present context where there are stock 
externalities with learning.17
*
2.e
 The problem, like the problem with instrument 
choice considered above, is that the tax in period 1 depends on  If we interpret 
ei as economic activity in each period, technology will allow increased economic 
activity with lower damages, θ. This depends on the technology available in the 
second period which, in turn, depends on the expected tax. We cannot separate the 
marginal harm from emissions from the tax rate when technology depends on the 
tax rate.  
To illustrate, suppose we think future technology will be very good. For 
example, we might expect to invent a cheap source of carbon-free energy or of 
eliminating persistent chemicals from the environment. In (1), we can interpret 
                                                 
17 While there is substantial research on the interaction of environmental policies and 
technology, I am not aware of work that incorporates irreversibilities of the sort captured in (1). 
Popp, Newell, and Jaffe (2010) provide a survey of recent work. Hart (2008) considers the timing 
of carbon taxes with endogenous technology but he uses simple expectations rather than allowing 
for future flexibility of the type allowed in (1). He concludes that in the central case Pigouvian 
taxes should not be adjusted for endogenous technology but on transition to a tax regime if the 
current stock is not optimal, it should be set higher. Because he uses simple expectations, he does 
not consider the interaction of tax rate and future behavior, which is central to the analysis here. 
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this as having a likely realization of θ that is low, so that *2e is high. If, however, 
we set low tax rates because of this expected development, we may not get the 
new technology. The development of pollution avoidance technologies might 
depend on a high price on pollution.   
We can rewrite (1) so that second period harm depends on the tax rates in 
the two periods: 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 21 21 1 2 2 1 2|{ , , }0 0max , max , .y ye eu e E E v e e eθ τ ττ τ θ δ≥ ≥  + − +     
The internal expected value term in the second period depends on τ1. This means 
that we cannot set the tax in the first period, τ1, without understanding how taxes 
will affect damages from emissions. Therefore, in this setting, the solution 
available in the flow-pollutant setting of just setting the tax equal to marginal 
harm, is not available.  
The problem is difficult because even though we are solving simultaneously 
for the optimal price and technology in (2), environmental technologies will still 
likely be subject to general policies regarding technology, such as patent law or 
R&D subsidies. Even understanding the direction of the effects – is the optimal 
Pigouvian tax higher or lower because of endogenous technology – would require 
a complex model.  
These considerations point to another advantage of tort liability over taxes. 
Because tort liability is equal to actual harm, we do not have to estimate *2.e  This 
means that we do not have to consider the effects of technology on *2e  or how 
those effects interact with general technology policies. If we set tort liability equal 
to actual harm, the environmental harm is internalized and we can think of the 
activity as taking place in a complete market just like other activities. General 
policies toward technology would apply.  
6. Conclusion 
The question we began with was whether Pigouvian taxes on stock 
externalities should take the precautionary principle into account. The answer 
depends on which version of the precautionary principle is considered. The 
weakest versions simply state that uncertainty about harm should not preclude 
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environmental actions. This version does apply to taxes. The optimal Pigouvian 
tax considers expected harms. Stronger versions of the precautionary principle 
would seem to imply that taxes should be higher than the Pigouvian amount 
(expected value of marginal harm) because of the possibility of learning and of 
irreversible harm. These versions suggest reducing emissions now to preserve 
flexibility in the future. These arguments do not apply to environmental taxes: if 
environmental taxes are set at equal to expected marginal harm, market actors will 
take appropriate precautions, including if appropriate, abating earlier. Pigouvian 
taxes decentralize these decisions to market actors by imposing a price on 
pollution. 
We also considered a number of extensions and limitations to the analysis. 
The central difficulty is that for stock externalities, the optimal tax in the first 
period depends on second period emissions, so we have to estimate second period 
choices to determine the tax rate. Calculating the tax therefore requires knowledge 
of abatement decisions which is similar to the knowledge required for setting 
command and control regulations. Moreover, if technology is endogenous, 
technology policies and taxes have to be set simultaneous because each depends 
on the other.  
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